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Connecting Carrier's Liability for Loss
or Damage to Shipments
W. David Alderson*
S A CARRIER LIABLE for a shipment it did not receive? What
is the situation when a carrier receives only part of the
goods from the preceding carrier, or when it receives them all
but in damaged condition? How is the carrier's liability af-
fected if the damage is latent or patent?
Discussion of these questions will be limited to shipments
in interstate commerce and in three basic areas: (1) carrier's
common law liability,1 (2) effect of federal enactments, and
(3) establishment of a prima facie case.
Carrier's Common Law Liability
Under the common law the connecting carrier was liable
for loss or damage only while the shipment was in its possession.
2
Dependent on the view taken,3 such a carrier acted as the agent
of the initial carrier or as the agent of the shipper. This did not
mean, however, that the initial carrier could not contract other-
wise with the shipper.
The common law placed a heavy burden on common car-
riers and held them accountable for all losses or injuries except
by Acts of God or by the Public Enemy.4 To escape this li-
ability the originating carriers devised contracts limiting their
liability to their own lines.5 The result was to shift upon the
shipping public the burden of establishing where the loss or
* B.S., Univ. of Idaho; M.B.A., Univ. of Wisconsin; Traffic Assistant, Union
Carbide Co., Cleveland; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 216 F. Supp. 244 (D. Mass. 1963).
2 Miller, Law of Freight Loss and Damage Claims 7 (2d ed. 1961); Strick-
land Transportation Co. v. Brown Express, 321 S. W. 2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959); Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 55
L. Ed. 167 (1911).
3 The English Courts treated the connecting carrier as the agent of the
originating carrier whereas the American Courts considered such a carrier
the agent of the shipper.
4 Common law exceptions were later extended to include the inherent na-
ture of the property, public authority and acts or default of the shipper.
United States v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 285 F. 2d 381 (8th Cir.
1960); Taff, Traffic Management 374 (1st ed. 1955); Adams Express v. Cro-
ninger, 226 U. S. 491, 57 L. Ed. 314 (1913).
5 Miller, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 13.
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damage occurred.6 This could conceivably involve separate ac-
tions against each carrier participating in the through move-
ment.
Although, through contract, the carriers could limit their
liability to their own lines, the common law imposed a high de-
gree of care upon them. The principal reasons were absolute
possession and control by the carrier, shipper's inability to pro-
tect the freight by his own efforts, and his difficulty in proving
fraud or negligence.7
Many cases loosely compare the carrier's liability with that
of an insurer. A common carrier is not an insurer even though
the extent of its responsibility may be equal to that of an insurer
or even greater. The nature of the two is not the same. The
contract of carriage does not call for indemnity independent of
care and custody. A carrier is not entitled to have the loss ad-
justed on principles peculiar to a contract of insurance. When
a loss occurs, unless the result of excepted causes, the carrier
is always at fault.8
Effect of Federal Enactments
As the common law liabilities became heavier with the
growth of transportation, the states began to confuse the issues
of rights and liabilities by passing their own statutes.9
One of the first federal enactments to clarify the situation
was the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act.'0
Basically, the Carmack Amendment affected rail carriers and
placed the burden on the originating carrier for loss or dam-
age to goods throughout its journey."' In essence this made the
connecting carrier the agent of the originating carrier.12 Several
subsequent amendments were made to the Interstate Commerce
6 Ibid.
7 Id. at 4.
8 Port Terminal Railroad Association v. Rohm & Haas Co., 371 S. W. 2d
403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Hall v. Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad Co.,
80 U. S. 367, 20 L. Ed. 594 (1872).
9 Miller, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 12.
10 34 Stat. 584, 49 USCA § 20 (11) (1906).
11 Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railroad Co. v. Metal-Matic,
Inc., 323 F. 2d 903 (8th Cir. 1963); Miller, op. cit. supra n. 2.
12 Miller, Id. at 13; Goliger Trading Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Railway Co.,
184 F. 2d 876 (7th Cir. 1950); McCready v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Co., 212 S. C. 449, 48 S. E. 2d 193 (1948); Atlantic Coast Line Co. v. River-
side Mills, supra n. 2.
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Act until passage of the Newton Amendment, which holds the
delivering carrier liable as well.13 This latter amendment allows
a vendee to file his claim with the local delivering carrier who
may be more co-operative than the more distant origin carrier.1
4
The rationale of the amendments is that, since the carriers have
exclusive control over the freight, it is better to place the
burden on either the originating or delivering carrier, who has
better access to the facts, than to require the claimant to prove
where the loss or injury took place. This added burden does not
appear harsh when considering the probability of prompt re-
imbursement by the carrier actually at fault. If prompt reim-
bursement is not made, the co-operation and through route
courtesies, between the carriers would be in jeopardy. 15 Similar
acts have since been passed affecting other forms of surface
transportation. 16
The common law was further modified by the passage of
the Bill of Lading Act 17 which standardized the terms of the
contract of carriage, and the instrument of the same name. The
effect has been to provide for a uniform standard of liability
which all originating carriers are required to issue.', The through
bill of lading governs the entire transaction and fixes the obli-
gations of all connecting carriers.1 9 A connecting carrier can-
not change the terms of the original bill of lading20 and, if none
is issued, one is implied.2 1 In the event an action is brought
directly against a connecting carrier, the contract provisions
made by the origin carrier enures to its benefit and its liability
is measured by its terms.
In addition to standardizing the contract of carriage, the
bill of lading allows the carrier to limit its common law 1i-
13 44 Stat. 1446, 49 USCA §20(11) (1927).
14 Thomas Foods v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 102 Ohio App. 76, 168 N. E.
2d 612 (1960); Atlantic Coast Line Co. v. Riverside Mills, supra n. 2.
15 Atlantic Coast Line Co. v. Riverside Mills, Ibid.
16 Motor Carriers-49 Stat. 543, 49 USCA § 319 (1935); Freight Forwarders
-56 Stat. 284, 49 USCA § 1013 (1942).
17 39 Stat. 538, 49 USCA §§ 81 thru 124 (1916).
18 34 Stat. 584, 49 USCA § 20(11) (1906).
19 Johnson Motor Transport v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 175 (U. S. Ct.
Claims 1957); Commodity Credit Corp. v. Norton, 167 F. 2d 161 (3rd Cir.
1948); Galveston Wharf Co. v. Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Rail-
way Co., 285 U. S. 127, 76 L. Ed. 659 (1932).
20 Inland Waterways Shippers Association v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line,
194 F. Supp. 818 (D. C. E. D. Mo. 1960).
21 34 Stat. 584, 49 USCA § 20 (11) (1906).
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ability.22 For this privilege the carrier must offer, in con-
sideration thereof, lower rates than would otherwise be charged.
A shipper is not obligated to utilize this standard bill of lading
and can hold the carrier to its full common law liability. When
this is done a ten percent increase in rates is assessed.23 Today,
the rules, regulations and rates filed with the regulating com-
missions enter into and form a part of all contracts of shipment
whether the shipper has notice of them or not. 24 Thus, the
liability of interstate carriers for loss or damage to freight is
based on the common law, the statutory law, the lawful con-
ditions of the bill of lading, the pertinent provisions of applicable
tariffs legally on file and the decisions of the federal courts. 25
Neither the original Carmack Amendment nor the Bill of
Lading Act abrogated the common law rule limiting the con-
necting carrier's liability to its own line.26 The intent of the
Carmack Amendment was not to confer new substantive rights
but only new remedial ones . 2  Any substantive rights, however,
that may flow from the statute are determined by reference
to the common law.28 As to actions between carriers, the Car-
mack Amendment has no application. Once an origin or desti-
nation carrier has paid the claimant, its only remedy is against
the carrier actually causing the loss or damage and it must
establish where this actually took place.2 9
The liability of domestic air carriers is somewhat more
lenient than that provided by the Carmark Amendment.30 Con-
gress has not deemed it advisable to impose the provisions of
that amendment upon the airline carriers. Here the common
22 Miller, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 86 & 87; Tedrow, Regulation of Transporta-
tion 65 (5th ed. 1959); Taff, op. cit. supra n. 4.
23 Tedrow, Ibid.
24 American Airlines v. Miller, 356 S. W. 2d 771 (Tex. 1962); Thomas Foods
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., supra n. 14.
25 Modern Wholesale Florist v. Braniff International Airways, 162 Tex. 594,
350 S. W. 2d 539 (1961); Miller, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 12; Thomas Foods v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., supra n. 14; Argo v. Southeastern Greyhound
Lines, 72 Ga. 309, 33 S. E. 2d 730 (1945).
26 Wald-Green Food Corp. v. Acme Fast Freight, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 768 (N. Y.
C. Mun. Ct. 1951).
27 J. & H. Flyer v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 316 F. 2d 203 (2d Cir. 1963).
28 Ibid.
29 Consolidated Forwarding v. Union Truck Depot, 356 S. W. 2d 693 (Tex.
Cir. App. 1962).
30 Federal Aviation Act-72 Stat. 731, 49 USCA § 1373 (a) (1958).
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law liability has not been extended beyond its own lines.3 1 If
a loss or damage occurs, neither the origin nor the destination
carrier can be held liable if it can prove that the injury occurred
prior or subsequent to the receipt by it. Domestic air carriers
are liable only in case of fault. In contrast, the liability of in-
ternational air carriers is similar to that provided for surface
carriers. The governing provisions of the Warsaw Convention32
also provide for remedial measures against either the origin or
destination carrier.
Under the existing statutes, all forms of transportation can
limit the amount of their liability by publishing released value
rates; however none of these carriers can exempt themselves
from liability for their own negligence.33 Although surface car-
riers utilize released value rates to some extent, the air carriers,
primarily, take advantage of this provision. The main purpose
behind the development of the limited liability doctrine is to
allow the carriers to grow without fear of being destroyed
financially by one catastrophe. 34 A secondary purpose is to al-
low the movement of certain valuable shipments at reduced
rates that could not otherwise be shipped except at exorbitant
rates.
Under the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, an air
carrier loses its right to limited liability if it fails to complete
the air bill of lading as provided. 35 Such a carrier may also lose
its right to limited liability if the loss or damage is wilfully
caused by an agent acting within the scope of employment. 30
Establishment of a Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie case against the origin or desti-
nation carrier, the claimant has the burden of proving the fol-
lowing three elements: (1) receipt of the shipment by the origin
carrier in good condition, (2) arrival of the shipment at desti-
nation in damaged condition and (3) amount of the loss sus-
81 American Airlines v. Miller, supra n. 24.
32 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air-49 Stat. 3000, Art. 30 (1929).
83 Miller, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 87.
84 Coblentz, Limitation of Liability for Aircraft, 23 So. Cal. L. R. 473 (1950).
35 Hardman, International Air Cargo Shipments under the Warsaw Con-
vention 121, 29 Ins. L. J. 120 (1962).
36 Id. at 124.
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tained.37 Contrary to general principles, the carrier has the
burden of proving freedom from negligence.
38
In the first element, the claimant must establish the good
condition of the merchandise when initially shipped.39 If the
bill of lading indicates the goods were tendered in apparent good
order, it raises a rebuttable presumption that they were free
from damage.40 The degree of proof necessary to satisfy the
first element will vary and depend on whether the damage was
latent or patent. If latent, the shipper's burden of proof may
not be satisfied by merely introducing the bill of lading in evi-
dence,4 1 for the facts on the bill are not conclusive.
42
The claimant also must show receipt of the goods at destina-
tion in a worse condition than when tendered for shipment.4 3
This is a prerequisite to carrier's liability.44 There is no reason
why damaged goods may not be shipped and, without proof to
the contrary, it may be presumed that they were shipped in the
same condition as received. In addition to all this, the claimant
must prove the market value before and after damage.
4 5
Once a prima facie case has been established, the claim-
ant may rely on the common law presumption that the damage
to goods, while in transit, was caused by the terminal carrier.46
The presumption consists of the statement of a probability and,
once shown, the burden is on the carrier to rebut or dispel the
37 Thomas Foods v. Pennsylvania Railroad, supra n. 14; Texas-Arizona Mo-
tor Freight v. Bennett, 324 S. W. 2d 32 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Yuspeh v.
Acme Fast Freight, 222 La. 747, 63 S. 2d 743 (1953); New Jersey Bell Tel.
Co. v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 11 N. J. S. 129, 78 A. 2d 150
(1950).
3a Hardman, op. cit. supra n. 35.
39 Yuspeh v. Acme Fast Freight, supra n. 37.
40 Ideal Plumbing & Heating Co. v. New York, New Haven and Hartford
Rwy., 143 Conn. 640, 124 A. 2d 908 (1956).
41 Ibid.
42 Miller, op. cit. supra n. 2; Silver Lining v. Shein's Express, 37 N. J. S. 206,
117 A. 2d 182 (1955).
43 Silver Lining v. Shein's Express, Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Texas-Arizona Motor Freight v. Bennett, supra n. 37; Gude v. Pennsyl-
vania Rwy. Co., 77 N. J. L. 391, 71 A. 1128 (1909).
46 Thompson v. Collins & Son, 263 S. W. 2d 186 (Tex. 1953); Herman v.
Railway Express Agency, 17 N. J. S. 10, 85 A. 2d 284 (1951); Commodity
Credit Corp. v. Norton, supra n. 19; Thompson v. San Pat Vegetable Co.,
207 S. W. 2d 195 (Tex. 1947); Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. Whit-
nack, 258 U. S. 369, 66 L. Ed. 665 (1922); Gude v. Pennsylvania Rwy. Co.,
supra n. 45; Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Adams, 78 Tex. 372, 14 S. W. 666(1890).
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presumption. The law accepts the probability that the loss oc-
curred on the terminal line because, to do otherwise, would
place an undue burden on the shipper.47
To avoid liability, the carrier sued, whether it be the origin
or the destination carrier, must either rebut the presumption or
establish non-liability by virtue of the excepted causes.48 Failure
to do either will result in a judgment for the claimant. How-
ever this does not mean that the claimant can not bring a direct
action against the mesne carrier. By doing so, however, the
claimant must affirmatively prove that he caused the loss or
damage.49 The common law presumption does not prevail against
the mesne carrier.50
Statutory relief action against the delivering carrier may be
defeated by proving non-receipt of the material shipped. The
so called "delivering carrier" need not establish where the loss
occurred but merely that it did not receive any part of the initial
shipment. A "delivering carrier" is one who receives actual or
constructive possession of the shipment and not one which
might or would have received it.51 Thus, the designation of a
delivering carrier in the bill of lading is not conclusive.
In a recent decision an international air carrier dispelled
the presumption that the loss of baggage occurred on its line;
however, under the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, this
delivering carrier was still held liable when part of the service
contracted for was performed. 52 In this case the carrier con-
tracted to transport both the passenger and his baggage. Per-
formance of part of his service was fatal to its immunity.
Although Congress has allowed domestic air carriers to limit
their liability to their own lines, this does not abrogate the com-
mon law presumption that the loss or damage occurred on the
4T Modern Wholesale Florist v. Braniff International Airways, supra n. 25.
48 Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railroad Co. v. Metal-Matic,
Inc., supra n. 11; Port Terminal Railroad Association v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
supra n. 8; Johnson Motor Transport v. United States, supra n. 19; Dietz v.
Southern Pac. Rwy. Co., 225 Mo. 39, 28 S. W. 2d 395 (1930); See supra n. 4
for list of excepted causes.
49 Miller, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 189.
50 Strickland Transp. Co. v. Johnston, 238 S. W. 2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951).
51 Riss & Company v. United States, 213 F. Supp. 791 (W. D. Mo. 1962)-
It is the writer's belief that the court may have properly held Riss and
Company liable as a destination carrier since the railroad was acting as
their agent under the provisions of Plan I.
52 Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corp., supra n. 1.
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destination carrier's line.53 Thus, a claimant is entitled to rely
on this presumption and need not establish where the loss or
damage actually occurred. The delivering air carrier may avoid
liability, however, by proving that the loss or damage occurred
prior to its receipt of the merchandise.
The recent trend of moving road trailers on flat cars is open-
ing a new and unsettled field in claims for loss and damage. Of
the five plans available to the shipper, Plan III is the most
troublesome.5 4 To date, no cases have been found defining the
carrier's liability. Basically, the rail carrier contracts to trans-
port the trailer owned or leased by the shipper from one major
terminal to another. The shipper is solely responsible for the
movement of the trailer to and from the ramp sites. The degree
of proof required becomes very critical considering that the
claimant has taken part in the through movement and may have
contributed to or caused the damage. Except where the rail
carrier is obviously at fault, it would appear that those utiliz-
ing this mode of transportation will continue to bear the loss
in the event of damage.
Conclusion
Most claims are settled without legal action. There is much
evasiveness as to loss or damage claims. Officials of enterprises
important to the economy and with high reputations for integrity
have been known to resort to the "big stick policy." 55 The carrier
understands very well that, if the claim is not paid, the business
may be lost to a competitor. Thus, the claimant with a large
volume of traffic can exert greater influence than the courts. On
the other hand, there are some carriers who dodge legitimate
claims, realizing that the claimant will not find it feasible to
prosecute. Shippers can ill afford to continue the use of such
carriers and will try other means wherever possible.
53 Modem Wholesale Florist v. Braniff International Airways, supra n. 25.
54 For an explanation of each plan, see 116 Traffic World 175 (1963).
55 Miller, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 4.
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